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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
KENNETH N. SILLI1H\N and 
UTAH ALLOY ORES, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiffs-Apellants, 
vs. 
REX T. POWELL, et al., 
Defendants-Respondents. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Appeal No. 17054 
REPLY-BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This suit was commenced by appellants to quiet title to 
their unpatented lode mining claims in the Yellow Cat mining 
district of Grand County, Utah, after respondents attempted to 
locate claims overlying those of appellants. 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellants rely on their earlier statment as to the 
disposition of the case in the lower court, including the 
paragraph which the Powell respondents objected to at Page 2 of 
their Brief. The failure of the trial court to make any of the 
findings necessitated by the doctrine of apportionment in the 
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face of substantial undisputed evidence that assessment work had 
been performed leads inexorably to the conclusion that, as 
stated earlier, "the court in effect ruled that since it found 
the work insufficient to satisfy t~e assessment requirement as 
to all claims, the work was insufficient to meet the requirement 
as to any claims." Brief of Appellants at 3. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants request that this Court reverse and vacate the 
judgment and findings of the Seventh Judicial District Court for 
Grand County, and remand this case for a new trial on the issue 
of the adequacy and sufficiency of the assessment work performed 
by appellants on their claims during the period September 1, 
1971, through September 1, 1978. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Appellants continue to rely on their Statement of Facts 
contained in their earlier Brief to this court at pages 4-23 
thereof. Supplementing that statement, appellants controvert 
the Statement of Material Facts of the Powell Respondents in the 
following particulars. 
Appellants take exception to the statement of the Powell 
respondents at Page 3 of their Brief that seventy-six of 
appellants eighty-four mining claims are not "contiguous" as 
that term is normally used with reference to mining claims. 
Each of the seventy-six mining claims in the main group of 
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appellants either overlaps one or more other claims, adjoins one 
or more claims along a substantial portion of a side or end 
boundary, or has at least one point in common with another 
claim. At most eight of the seventy-six mining claims in the 
main group could be said to be connected with the main group at 
only a single point of reference (See Plaintiffs' Exhibit 11). 
Moreover, the approximately three and one-half mile distance 
over which this main group of claims extends cannot be 
considered at all extraordinary considering the extensive reach 
of the underlying uranium deposits that had been previously 
located, and in many cases already partially mined, especially 
when the later-located claims of the Powells covered the same or 
greater surface area. (See Exhibits 11 and 59.) 
Furthermore, it is not true, as Powells assert at Page 4 of 
their Brief, that when they located their claims they "found no 
indication of prior claims," "found no location monuments •. 
no corner monuments, and no evidence that recent assessment work 
had been done in the area." Powells did admit to seeing some 
monuments and other workings that indicated the presence of 
previous claims. (Tr. at 565, and 632-38). Additionally, the 
check that Dan Powell made of the records at the Grand County 
Recorder's Office, by his own testimony, only covered claims 
whoses names and ownership had been identified in the field, and 
thus no attempt was made to use a tract index to identify the 
ownership of claims indicated by the presence of monuments and 
markers which respondents did see in the field (Tr. at 566). 
-4-
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The same applies to Teare respondents. Despite the 
assertions made in their Brief at Page 3, regarding the alleged 
conscientiousness of the Teares to avoid locating claims in 
conflict with pre-existing claims, _.the record is devoid of any 
indication that Teares ever searched the tract index at the 
County Recorder's Office to determine whether any mining claims 
previously located conflicted with their own. Teares also. 
admitted to having seen some monuments and mine workings, the 
status of which they claimed they could not identify and which 
they conveniently assumed to have been abandonded (~, Tr. at 
842, and 891). 
Appellants further note that the statement at the top of 
Page 8 of the Brief for the Powell respondents about previous 
lawsuits is improper and should be stricken, for it involves a 
part of the transcript of the Silliman deposition never read 
into evidence at the trial. 
Although it is true that the composite map known as Exhibit 
11 showing all of appellants' mining claims does show minor (not 
major) differences in the way no more than fifteen of plaintiffs 
eighty-four claims were plotted by the different surveys, in 
even the most extreme case the difference was no more than about 
three hundred feet and the discrepancies were hardly such as to 
create a "major obstacle" for determining the open ground that 
remained available for location of new mining claims, as alleged 
at Page 8 of the Powell Brief (Tr. at 158-69}. 
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Both groups of respondents in their Briefs challenge the 
fifty-dollar per hour valuation figure used by appellant 
Silliman in computing the value of his labor and improvements to 
his claims. However, contrary to the assertions of respondents, 
this fifty-dollar figure is consistent with the testimony 
introduced by witnesses for respondents. The assessment work 
whose value is in question covers the period from October 1972 
through August 1977. Brief of appellant at 13-17. According to 
the testimony of Mr. J. D. Wilson, the former owner of a dirt 
contracting company who retired from the business in 1973, his 
company charged sixteen dollars an hour for an operator at non 
union wages and a D-6 Caterpillar in 1971 to do road work in the 
Four Corners area. He indicated that this was a going rate for 
such services. He further testified that prices had gone up 
tremendously since he left the business and that 1971 was the 
latest year for which he had records (Tr. at 645-48). By late 
1972, when appellant Silliman performed the first work relevant 
to the present issues, he had over twenty-five years experience 
as an operator of a caterpillar on mining claims. Even without 
considering Mr. Silliman's intimate knowledge of the claims in 
the Yellow Cat area, his experience alone would have allowed him 
to charge twenty-five dollars an hour in 1972 doing work on the 
property of others. When his intimate working knowledge of the 
mining claims at issue acquired over a twenty-five year period 
is considered, it is not at all unrealistic to state that the 
value of work he performed on these claims would be doubled to 
-6-
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the fifty dollar per hour figure used. While it is true that 
nominal rates continued to go up with inflation during the 1970s 
dramatically, as Mr. Boulden testified, it seems apparent that 
appellant Silliman was talking in ~eal, not nominal, terms for 
the whole period involved and that is why the fifty-dollar 
figure he used was not increased with the passage of time. 
Appeallant Silliman's single valuation figure, reflecting real 
purchasing power or labor vale in 1972, is the more appropriate 
method of calculating the value of labor or improvements, as 
those terms are used in 30 u.s.c. § 28, because it is the value 
of labor performed on or benefiting the mining claim that 
matters. 
This testimony harmonizes with the approximate figure of 
thirty dollars per hour quoted by appellant Silliman as the rate 
charged for work he did on other property some year or two prior 
to the time of trial7 this figure was not a 1979 figure as 
Powell respondents assert in their Brief at pages 9 and 10 (Tr. 
at 377, 406). It should further be noted that the figures 
quoted by Mr. Boulden at Page 11 of Powells' Brief are only 
going rates for an outside operator, they are not rates that 
reflect the experience of appellant Silliman and his knowledge 
of the property in issue. 
It should be noted that at page 13 of respondent Powell's 
Brief there is an apparent typographical error. On the sixth 
and seventh lines from the bottom of the page, it states that of 
212 total assessment work hours claimed for the year ending 
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September 1, 1975, "197 11 hours were spent in road maintenance 
and rehabilitation. This should read "107 11 as on the fifth line 
from the bottom of the page. 
At Pages 13 through 17 of respondent Powell's Brief, much is 
made of certain photos taken that were introduced at the trial 
which were asserted to fairly represent some of the "principal" 
roads in the disputed area. While the photographs speak for 
themselves, their relevance as to date and as to depiction of 
areas where appellants performed assesment work has never been 
established. Appellants rely on their statements at Pages 19 
and 20 of their earlier Brief. A quick review of the pages of 
the trial transcript cited there will immediately make it clear 
that appellants first made their assertions about which roads 
were maintained before the introduction of these photographs. 
Appellants again object to the use at page 19 of the Powell 
Brief of material from a deposition when that part of the 
deposition was never read into evidence at the trial. The 
statement of the court at pages 412-13 of the trial transcript 
that the depositions "are published and become a part of the 
record" is not sufficient to allow the use on appeal of portions 
of the depositions not actually read verbatim in court to 
appeallant Silliman because to do so is to deny his rights to be 
confronted with such material and to be given the opportunity to 
explain any discrepancy that may exist. 
Finally, it should be noted that the Powell respondents at 
Page 26 of their Brief distort and misread what appellant said 
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at Page 21 of their Brief relating to the lack of written 
records kept by appellant to verify his account of assessment 
performed. Appellants reference to records later tendered 
refers to their Motion for a New Trial with accompanying 
affidavits of Kenneth and Blaine Silliman at pages 285-95 of the 
Record, not the pages of the trial transcript which respondents 
refer to. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT MISAPPLIED THE LAW APPLICABLE TO THE 
PERFORMANCE OF ASSESSMENT WORK FOR 
ASSOCIATED MINING CLAIMS 
Responding to the first argument of appellants' Brief, the 
Powell respondents, at page 34 of their Brief, conclude that the 
trial court did not misapply the law to the facts of this case 
but that it merely founds appellants; evidence as to what they 
did without credibility. This conclusion does not withstand 
scrutiny. The first paragraph of the court's Memorandum 
Decision, the only document actually authored by the court, 
stated that the court did not "reject as intentionally false any 
of the testimony." This statement plainly contradicts the 
assertion of the Powell respondents that the Court found 
appellants testimony "so incredulous that the Court was unable 
to find any facts favorable to appellants." Moreover, the 
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alleged substantiation quoted above from Finding No. 18 is 
merely a repetition of respondents' own prior conclusion, 
inasmuch as this finding was drafted by respondents themselves. 
Further examination of the cou~t's Memorandum Decision 
supports the position of appellants that the court did not find 
appellants' evidence with regard to the performance of 
assessment work to be without substance, but that the court only 
discounted the value of the work performed by appellants. 
Beginning in the second paragraph, the Memorandum Decision 
continues as follows: 
The evidence of the Plaintiffs does not convince the 
Court that sufficient or adequate assessment work 
was done in order to hold the conflict areas 
involved. The testimony of the other witnesses 
define an ostensible lack of assessment work, 
coupled with a general deterioration of or corner 
and discovery monuments indicative of abandonment 
brought on by the discontinuance of the productive 
mining adventure that existed in years prior 
thereto. 
An additional element confronts the Court with 
reference to the apparent lack of assessment work. 
If claims are grouped so that assessment is 
allocated to the entire group or groups, some 
showing must be made that the entire group or groups 
indeed derived some benefit. In this case, where 
the groupings are so diversified and spread, the 
Court finds it difficult to find that road work, 
claimed as assessment work, on roads that in no way 
connect or service diversified groups of claims, 
satisfies the requirements of the law, and 
regulations mandating an intention to hold. 
The inference is inescapable from this Memorandum Opinion 
that the court accepted that at least most of the work alleged 
to have been done by appellants was indeed performed. What 
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clearly concerned the court was the character of the work and 
the benefit to the claims accruing therefrom, not the fact of 
its performance. 
With the realization that asse~sment work in some quantity 
was performed by appellants upon or leading to their mining 
claims, and that at least this much was accepted by the trial 
court as having been proven, the next inquiry is whether the 
work benefited the mining claims in question. As this Court 
recently recognized in a case involving the Powell respondents 
decided shortly after appellants' earlier Brief in this case was 
filed, it is "universally recognized that [assessment] work need 
not be performed on each individual claim, but may be made upon 
an adjacent interrelated claim if it can be deemed to benefit 
the claim." Powell v. Atlas Corp., 615 P.2d 1225, 1228 (Utah 
1980). That holding of this Court reaffirmed as the law of this 
state a position squarely opposed to that urged by Powells (the 
same people who are among respondents in the present appeal) in 
that case, namely that assessment work is not sufficient to 
satisfy the requirements of 30 u.s.c.A § 28 when "not done on 
certain of the claims themselves, but on other claims in the 
area." Id., 615 P.2d at 1227. It should be noted that the 
similarities between Powell v. Atlas Corp. and the present case 
are striking. In both cases, Powells were junior locaters 
asserting the invalidity of prior located claims on the basis 
that proper assessment work had not been done. The critical 
assessment years were the same three as in the case at bar, 
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namely those ending September 1, 1973, 1974, and 1975. The only 
difference is that in Powell v. Atlas Corp., the trial court did 
not accept the position of the Powell's that work done outside 
the boundaries of the claim may not be applied toward preserving 
that claim from relocation while in the instant case, the trial 
court, while voicing vague adherence to the theory that 
assessment work performed for an entire group of claims is 
sufficient to satisfy the federal statute where the claims are 
benefitted by the work, misapplied this law to the facts by 
demanding discharge of an almost impossible burden, namely that 
drillsite preparation and road maintenance and rehabilitation to 
provide access to claims for their future development over an 
extensive deposit of uranium ore be allocated to artifically 
small segments of a larger group in the face of uncontroverted 
expert testimony that work tending to the development of any 
part of this extensive ore body was work benefiting other parts 
of the ore body as far as the claims extended and for up to a 
distance of almost five miles. 
Appellants' earlier Brief establishes sufficient 
misunderstanding or misapplication of the relevant law to 
require a retrial of the issue of the adequacy of the assessment 
work performed by appellants in light of the clarification 
provided by this Court of the law relating to assessment work 
for groups of claims in Powell v. Atlas Corp. 
This leads to a consideration of the value of the road work 
performed by appellant Silliman which should be credited to his 
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mining claims. At page 39 of the Powell brief, it is asserted 
that "'repetitive roadwork, especially road maintenance' does 
not qualify as annual assessment work," on the authority of a 
statement made in a seminar of Maroh 1, 1979, sponsored by the 
Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation. It should be noted that 
this seminar was one prepared for and delivered to landmen and 
paralegals. Such a restrictive view of what work will qualify 
as assessment work does not conform with what the law is. 
Furthermore, this statement is not the view of the Rocky 
Mountain Mineral Law Foundation as an institution, but merely 
that of the author of the quoted paper, and by no stretch of the 
imagination is it a "consensus of hundreds of lawyers and 
scholars who devote a great percentage of their time to mining 
law and who are recognized on a national level as experts in 
their field," as respondents assert. Indeed, in another 
publication of the same Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation 
entitled "Annual Assessment Work" and subtitled "A definitive 
Legal Research Manual," it is stated at pages 2-35 and 2-36 
that: 
The construction and maintenance of roads for 
access to and from claims has always been considered 
to be labor or improvement for annual assessment 
work, provided it is directly related to the 
development of the claims or facilitation of 
extraction of minerals from them. 
For further support of the proposition that road work, including 
road maintenance, is clearly labor satisfing the requirements of 
30 U.S.C.A. § 28, see the cases and other materials cited at 
pages 32-35 of appellants earlier Brief. 
-13-
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It should also be noted that contrary to the assertions at 
page 41 of the Powell brief, mere proximity of a claim to a 
county road does not render work on private roads connecting the 
claim or associated drillsites to the county road valueless. 
Unless there are roads to transport machinery to the claim and 
ores from the claim, mere proximity of another road is of no 
help. 
Nor is it accurate to characterize appellants' assessment 
work as mere token compliance with the requirements of the 
federal statute to discredit the good faith with which the work 
was performed. This road work clearly had no purpose other than 
the development of the ore body present. No other purpose for 
building roads in the Yellow Cat vicinity existed. While it may 
be admitted that a primary motivation for performing this work 
during the years in issue was to satisfy the requirements of the 
law, that is because it was economically imprudent, not only for 
appellants, but for anyone else, to do more than this minimal 
development work in light of existing market conditions. Yet 
this does not discredit the good faith of appellants because 
they had already spent more than 25 years actively mining the 
area in question prior to the temporary cessation of such 
activities in 1972. Support for this position is provided in a 
consideration of the justification for the assessment work 
requirement set out at Section 7.2 of Volume 2 of the respected 
treatise entitled The American Law of Mining edited by the Rocky 
Mountain Mineral Law Foundation, which reads: 
-14-
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The purpose of the assessment work requirement 
is to assure good faith and diligence and to prevent 
a claimant from locating numerous mining claims and 
holding the claims without working them, thus 
preventing others from occupying and developing the 
property. 
The cheif objection to the assessment work 
requirement is that the mining industry is 
particularly susceptible to fluctuating prices. 
When the price of the product from a particular mine 
justifies operations, the mine will be developed or 
worked regardless of the assessment work 
requirement. On the other hand, during periods of 
deflated prices, the assessment work requirement 
merely adds to the economic woes of the already 
troubled mine owner. This objection is appropriate 
when applied to claim owners who actually mine their 
claims when economic conditions permit. However, 
the objection is not applicable to those persons who 
acquire mining property for purposes of speculation; 
if there were no assessment work requirement, or 
some adequate substitute, all potentially valuable 
mineral land would soon be located as mining claims 
and would never again be available for bona fide 
location. 
To this it may be added that mining claim owners, like all 
other business men, seek to maximize their profits by minimizing 
expenses through prudent exploration and development. The 
government, while justly requiring the expenditure of time and 
effort to improve the claims as evidence of the locator's good 
faith, must protect the locator's investment in these 
improvements as long as the locator is substantially complying 
with the annual assessment work requirements and allow the 
locator sufficient time to prudently develop the claim and 
extract the ore therefrom or the locator, without such assurance 
of future protection, will be loath to expend any substantial 
amount of time and effort making the investments in ore 
extraction and claim development desired by society. If the 
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courts are too quick in declaring forfeitures, few individuals 
will be willing to take the risk of inadvertantly losing 
significant investments of time and money, leaving a greatly 
restricted pool of very risk prefe~ring parties to engage in the 
mineral extraction industry. This course would lead to a 
concomitant increase in purely speculative holdings and society 
at large would be the loser with less minerals being marketed at 
correspondingly higher prices for an unchanged or increasing 
demand level. 
II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOCATING 
THE BURDEN OF ASSESSMENT WORK 
"[T]he burden of proving a forfeiture is always upon the 
party relying upon the same . . " Hall v. Kearney, 18 Colo. 
505, 33 P. 373 (1893), cited by Powells at page 31 of their 
brief. This risk of non-persuasion is borne by the party urging 
a forfeiture throughout the duration of a trial and can only be 
discharged by clear and convincing proof. New Mercur Mining Co. 
v. South Mercur Mining Co., 102 Utah 131, 128 P. 2d 269, 272 
{1942) cert. den. 319 U.S. 753 {1943). It is only the "burden" 
of going forward or the duty to produce evidence substantial 
enough to get past a motion for summary judgment that shifts 
from a junior locator to a senior locator when it is shown that 
the assessment work performed by the senior locator included 
work performed outside the boundary of the claims which the work 
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is asserted to have benefitted. Once the senior locator 
presents such ·evidence, the risk of non-persuasion always borne 
by the junior locator compels him to rebut the evidence that the 
assessment work had been performed_by the senior locator as 
alleged or to show that this work did not benefit the mining 
claims for whose behalf it is asserted. 
In the present case, it is clear the court did not reject in 
toto the fact of the performance of the assessment work 
described by appellants and offered in evidence. It is likewise 
clear that respondents did not introduce any substantial 
evidence to rebut the evidence presented by appellant Silliman 
and his expert witness that the work of appellants would benefit 
the entire body of appellants' claims. The alleged inability of 
the trial court to make a finding as to the value of the 
assessment work performed by appellants is not, as respondents 
asserted, due to the failure of appellants to produce credible 
evidence of the value of their work. This so-called finding of 
fact drafted· by respondents and quoted at paqe 44 of the Powell 
Brief was the result of an improper allocation of the burden of 
proof inasmuch as the evidence offered by respondents fell 
substantially short of the quantity required to rebut the 
evidence offered by appellants. 
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III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT APPLYING THE 
DOCTRINE OF APPORTIONMENT. 
Even if the trial court did not accept in toto the evidence 
offered by appellants as to the quantity and value of the 
assessment work they performed, it is clear that the court did 
not reject all of this evidence either. Given the undisputed 
fact that some assessment work was performed by appellants for 
the benefit of their claims and the fact that the character of 
this work was never shown not to confer the benefits claimed for 
it, the trial court defaulted in its duty by not finding the 
value so conferred on appellants' mining claims. Such a failure 
to make required findings of fact is reversible error. Romrell 
v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 611 P. 2d 392 (Utah 1980.). Once the 
value of the work is established pursuant to the apportionment 
doctrine of Utah Standard Mining Co. v. Tintic Indian Chief 
Mining & Milling Co., 73 Utah 456, 274 P. 950 (1929), it must be 
determined how that value is to be allocated among the several 
claims benefited by the work where that value is short of the 
statutory minimum for preserving all the mining claims. In the 
instant case, it cannot be determined at this point whether this 
is the case because the trial court refused to make a finding as 
to the value of the work performed by appellants. However, even 
assuming the trial court might have found that the total value 
of appellants' assessment work was less than that necessary to 
preserve all their claims, the decision must be faced as to how 
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that value is to be allocated. The law of this state as 
established in Utah Standard is that the greatest number of 
claims possible should be preserved by allocating the total 
value of the labor performed or improvements made to as many of 
the claims actually benefited by the work as possible. This 
rule is not unduly generous for it merely secures for the owner 
of a senior location who has acted in good faith the exclusive 
riqht to continue developing that amount of mineral land for 
which he has paid the full investment price required by law and 
for which he continues to bear all the risk that the venture 
will not prove profitable. 
CONCLUSION 
For the trial court's failure to properly apply the 
standards of law relating to the group development of claims 
held in common, for its failure to properly allocate the burden 
of proof, for its failure to make findings necessitated by the 
doctrine of apportionment, and for manifest confusion on what 
the facts were and on which facts were relevant to a 
determination of the issues in this case, or for any one of 
those errors, the trial court's decision should be reversed, all 
findings vacated, and this matter remanded for a new trial on 
the limited issue of complience with the requirements of 30 
u.s.c. Section 28. 
-19-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Respectfully submitted this if,-
----
day of February, 1981. 
N !ELS~ & S' IOR 
~_vvv',r-· ~ Bre~Ward 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-
Appellants 
1100 Beneficial Life Tower 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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of February, 1981. 
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